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UP IN THE AIR:  
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY V. MACLEAN AND THE 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION 
ACT 
MIKE BRETT 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sprang into existence 
almost overnight,1 growing into the third-largest federal government 
agency in the United States.2 Its mission—“to patrol borders, protect 
travelers and [] transportation infrastructure, enforce immigration 
laws, and respond to disasters and emergencies”—is carried out daily 
by over 216,000 employees.3 Despite the gravity of this charge, DHS 
employees nonetheless remain subject to the same labor and 
employment disputes of any ordinary office or agency. Resolution of 
such disputes is messy in the best of environments, and becomes all 
the more complicated when national security is at stake. An employee 
may have an honest disagreement with management, but what 
happens when that disagreement implicates Sensitive Security 
Information (SSI) and the potential safety of American civilians? 
 
 
 
 
 J.D. Candidate, Class of 2016, Duke University School of Law. I would like to give special 
thanks to Professor Neil Siegel for his advice and guidance on this Commentary. 
 1. Creation of the Department of Homeland Security, DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 21, 
2014), http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security. 
 2.  The Executive Branch, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-
government/executive-branch (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). 
 3.  Id. 
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In Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean,4 the Court will 
address whether a federal employee is protected under the 
Whistleblower Protection Act5 when that employee speaks out on an 
issue of national security.6 The Court’s focus will rest on whether or 
not disclosure of SSI is “specifically prohibited by law,” which 
crucially hinges on whether agency regulations authorized by 
Congressional mandate are themselves “law,” or are merely 
administrative rules unenforceable for purposes of the Whistleblower 
Protection Act.7 
The Court will address two questions. First, may the phrase 
“specifically prohibited by law” be interpreted to include agency rules 
and regulations, as in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,8 or is “law” strictly 
limited to Congressional statutes? Second, is the language of the Air 
Transportation and Security Act (ATSA) sufficiently specific that an 
employee’s disclosure is prohibited by virtue of the statute itself, 
where Congress gives express authority to the agency to create 
regulations promulgating the statute?9 This commentary will cover the 
factual and legal background of the case, and provide analysis of how 
the Court may consider the primary arguments of both sides. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Underlying Facts 
Less than two years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) learned of a 
possible plot to hijack United States planes.10 TSA briefed the Federal 
Air Marshal Service (FAMS) about this threat in July 2003.11 
 
 
 
 4.  Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, No. 13-894 (U.S. argued Nov. 4, 2014). 
 5.  5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8) (West 2014). 
 6.  Brief for Petitioner at I, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, No. 13-894 (U.S. July 25, 
2014). 
 7.  See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 714 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 2290 (2014) [hereinafter MacLean IV] (finding “MacLean’s disclosure is not 
‘specifically prohibited by law’ within the meaning of the WPA”). 
 8.  Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
 9.  See MacLean IV, 714 F.3d at 1308–10. 
 10.  MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 116 M.S.P.R. 562, 564 (2011) [hereinafter 
MacLean III]. 
 11.  Id. 
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Later that month, Federal Air Marshal (FAM) Robert J. 
MacLean12 received an order stating all long-distance and 
international flights (or “remain overnight” missions) out of Las 
Vegas were to be cancelled until August 9.13 Concerned, MacLean 
approached his supervisor to confirm the directive.14 It had been sent 
via unencrypted text message to his unsecured cell phone, rather than 
as an encrypted message to his government-issued personal digital 
assistant, and it was not specifically labeled SSI.15 Moreover, the 
directive had significant security implications—MacLean believed 
cancelling these “remain overnight” missions would put the flying 
public in danger, especially in light of the recently discovered 
hijacking threat.16 His supervisor confirmed the order, explaining the 
agency did not have the budget to conduct such missions at that time 
and were temporarily pulling all FAMs from international and long-
distance flights.17 MacLean, unsatisfied, approached an employee in 
the DHS Office of the Inspector General, but his concerns were again 
rebuffed.18 
Having failed to effect change from within the organization, 
MacLean contacted MSNBC reporter Brock Meeks and revealed the 
TSA deployment plan in order to “create a controversy resulting in 
rescission of the directive.”19 On July 29, 2003, MSNBC.com published 
an article entitled Air Marshals Pulled from Key Flights, which made 
public that “[d]espite renewed warnings about possible airline 
hijackings, the Transportation Security Administration has alerted 
federal air marshals that as of Friday they will no longer be covering 
cross-country or international flights.”20 Members of Congress caught 
wind of the news story and criticized the TSA deployment plan, 
ensuring the directive was withdrawn before it ever went into effect.21 
 
 12.  MacLean joined the FAMS in 2001, and at the time of the incident which led to his 
removal, he was a federal employee pursuant to 5 U.S.C.A. § 7511(a)(1)(West 2014). Id. (citing 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, §101, 115 Stat. 597 (2001)). 
 13.  MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 564, 568. 
 14.  Id. at 565.  
 15.  Id. at 564.  
 16.  Id. at 564–65. 
 17.  See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 59a, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, No. 
13-894 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2014) (“My supervisor told me that the Service ran out of funds for 
overtime, per diem, mileage and lodging.”). 
 18.  MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 56. 
 19.  Id. at 565. 
 20.  Id. (citing Brock N. Meeks, Air Marshals Pulled from Key Flights, MSNBC (July 29, 
2003), http://uslaboragainstwar.org/article.php?id=1429). 
 21.  MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 565. 
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MacLean was not mentioned in the MSNBC article, and 
continued serving in the FAMS without notifying anyone of the 
unauthorized disclosure.22 Following the incident, MacLean 
determined the FAMS should speak with “a collective voice,” and 
became active in the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association 
(FLEOA).23 
In 2004, about a year after his initial unauthorized disclosure, 
MacLean appeared on NBC Nightly News to criticize the FAMS 
dress code, which he believed made air marshals too easily 
identifiable.24 Despite appearing on the program disguised as “Air 
Marshal Mike,” someone from the TSA recognized MacLean’s voice 
and reported him.25 In the ensuing investigation, MacLean admitted 
to agents from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
Office of Professional Responsibility that he was the one who had 
disclosed the 2003 directive to MSNBC without authorization.26 
The TSA proposed MacLean’s removal on three grounds: first, his 
unauthorized media appearance; second, his unauthorized release of 
information to the media; and third, his unauthorized disclosure of 
SSI.27 The agency sustained only the third charge and fired MacLean 
on April 11, 2006.28 The TSA issued a subsequent order classifying the 
2003 directive as SSI on August 31, 200629—over three years after 
MacLean made the disclosure, and four months after he was removed. 
MacLean appealed his removal through two main avenues. First, 
he sought an order that his disclosure did not actually include SSI 
because the information was not classified as SSI in 2003.30 Second, he 
sought an order that his disclosure was protected under the 
Whistleblower Protection Act.31 
 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 86a. 
 27.  MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 565.  
 28.  MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 112 M.S.P.R. 4, 6 (2009) [hereinafter MacLean 
II]. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  See MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 543 F.3d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008) 
[hereinafter MacLean I] (finding the order classifying the 2003 text message as SSI was not a 
retroactive agency adjudication). 
 31.  See id. at 1150 (finding the Whistleblower Protection Act did not apply to the order at 
issue). 
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B.  Ninth Circuit Decision 
MacLean sought a court order that the TSA could not 
retroactively classify the 2003 directive as SSI.32 He petitioned the 
Ninth Circuit for review of the TSA’s order.33 
On September 16, 2008, the Ninth Circuit upheld the TSA’s 
classification and determined that MacLean had indeed leaked SSI.34 
Under the definition in effect at the time of the directive, SSI 
consisted of “specific details of aviation security measures,” including 
but not limited to “information concerning specific numbers of 
Federal Air Marshals, deployments, or missions, and the methods 
involved in such operations.”35 The court found the retroactive 
classification by the TSA made no difference, as “information falling 
within this designation is automatically considered ‘sensitive security 
information’ without further action from the TSA.”36 In other words, 
the information in the 2003 directive qualified as SSI whether or not 
the TSA explicitly labeled it as such at the time, because it contained 
the kind of information automatically understood in the TSA’s 
regulatory scheme to be SSI.37 Additionally, the TSA’s classification 
did not violate the Whistleblower Protection Act, because it was not a 
“personnel action” within the meaning of the Act, but merely an 
official determination that the 2003 text message contained SSI.38 
MacLean claimed he did not know the text message was SSI at the 
time of his disclosure.39 It was sent as an unencrypted text message to 
his cell phone rather than to his secure, government-issued PDA, and 
 
 32.  See id. at 1152 (discussing the potential retroactivity of the classification as SSI). 
 33.  Id. at 1148. 
 34.  Id. at 1150. 
 35.  Civil Aviation Security Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. 8340, 8352 (Feb. 22, 2002) (codified at 49 
C.F.R. pt. 1500 et seq.). 
 36.  See MacLean I, 543 F.3d at 1150 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1520.7 (2003)). 
 37.  The TSA regulations prohibited unauthorized disclosure of “information concerning 
the deployments, numbers, and operations of Coast Guard personnel engaged in maritime 
security duties and Federal Air Marshals, to the extent it is not classified national security 
information.” 49 C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)(8)(ii) (2003). This “includes, but is not limited to, 
information concerning specific numbers of Federal Air Marshals, deployments or missions and 
the methods involved in such operations.” 49 C.F.R. § 1520.7(j) (2003). In addition, a “covered 
person must disclose, or otherwise provide access to, SSI only to covered persons who have a 
need to know, unless otherwise authorized in writing by TSA.” 49 C.F.R. §1520.9(a)(2) (2003). 
Finally, “[v]iolation of this part is grounds for a civil penalty and other enforcement or 
corrective action by DHS, and appropriate personnel actions for Federal employees.” 49 C.F.R. 
§ 1520.17 (2003). 
 38.  MacLean I, 543 F.3d at 1150–51.  
 39.  MacLean IV, 714 F.3d 1301, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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was not labeled SSI.40 However, the court determined MacLean’s plea 
of ignorance was not credible in light of his testimony that he 
attended an air marshal training in November 2001, during which the 
term “sensitive information” was used to describe flight times, flight 
numbers, and airline information.41 He confessed that “[i]f I told 
somebody that a particular flight was not going to have any 
protection on it, that endangered that specific flight.”42 Moreover, he 
“admit[ted] that he signed a nondisclosure agreement as a condition 
of his employment, which state[d] that Marshals ‘may be removed’ for 
‘[u]nauthorized release of security-sensitive or classified 
information.’”43 Consequently, the court found MacLean should 
reasonably have understood the 2003 directive to be SSI regardless of 
whether it was officially classified as such at the time. 
Later, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that 
whether or not MacLean knew he was disclosing SSI, the regulation 
prohibiting disclosure contains no intent element, meaning that 
MacLean’s subjective belief that the 2003 directive was not SSI makes 
no difference in evaluating his culpability.44 In fact, if his intentions 
mattered, it would have made the case against him even stronger: 
during the investigation, MacLean admitted: 
“[d]ue to the fact my chain of command, the DHS [Inspector 
General] and my Congressmen all ignored my complaints and 
would not follow up with investigations, I have NO REGRETS or 
feel NO REMORSE for going to a credible and responsible media 
representative, Brock Meeks. Brock Meeks reporting these gross 
mismanagement issues has resulted in immediate and positive 
change in deadly FAMS policies.”45 
He further claimed it did not matter to him whether the 
information was SSI, and that he would have revealed the 
information however it was classified.46 As a result, management lost 
“all . . . confidence in his ability at that point.”47 
 
 40.  MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. 562, 564 (2011). 
 41.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 72a. 
 42.  Id. at 74a. 
 43.  MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 580. 
 44.  Maclean IV, 714 F.3d at 1306 (finding that “because the regulation prohibiting 
disclosure of SSI does not include an intent element, Mr. MacLean cannot be exonerated by his 
subjective belief that the content of the text message was not SSI”). 
 45.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 45a (emphasis in original). 
 46.  Id. at 44a–45a.  
 47.  Id. at 108a. 
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C.  Merit Systems Protection Board Decision 
After failing to demonstrate his disclosure did not contain SSI, 
MacLean next challenged his removal on the ground that the 
Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) protected his disclosure.48 
Before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), MacLean 
claimed the agency could not “take a personnel action” against an 
employee for disclosing certain types of information when the 
employee “reasonably believe[d]” that the information showed a 
“violation of any law, rule or regulation” or “gross mismanagement, a 
gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and 
specific danger to public health or safety.”49 
The Board never reached the question of whether MacLean 
reasonably believed the 2003 directive presented a “substantial and 
specific danger” to public safety, because the WPA does not apply if 
the disclosure is “specifically prohibited by law.”50 The Board found 
his disclosure was indeed “specifically prohibited by law,” as the TSA 
had been given express authority by Congress to create regulations 
prohibiting the release of SSI.51 As a consequence, the Board rejected 
MacLean’s argument, finding his disclosure was not protected under 
the WPA, and sustained the Agency’s decision to remove him.52 
MacLean appealed the decision to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.53 
 
 48.  MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 569. 
 49.  The relevant provision of the Act reads in full:  
(b) Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or 
approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority— 
(8) take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action with 
respect to any employee or applicant for employment because of—  
(A) any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the 
employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences— 
(i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or  
(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, 
or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, if such 
disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information is 
not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the 
interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs. 
5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i)–(ii) (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
 50.  MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 581; see also 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii) (West 2014) 
(disallowing personnel action for the disclosure of information that evidences a “substantial and 
specific danger” to public safety). 
 51.  MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 581; see 49 U.S.C.A. § 40119(b) (West 2014) (setting out 
TSA’s authority to create regulations prohibiting disclosures of security information). 
 52.  MacLean III, 116 M.S.P.R. at 581. 
 53.  MacLean IV, 714 F.3d 1301, 1310–11 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
BRETT 1.29.15 - FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2015  11:37 AM 
68 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 10 
D.  Federal Circuit Decision 
Reviewing de novo, the Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s 
decision and found MacLean’s disclosure protected under the WPA 
because it was not “specifically prohibited by law,” but rather only 
prohibited by regulation.54 The Federal Circuit found “[i]n order to 
fall under the ‘specifically prohibited by law’ proviso, a ‘disclosure 
must be prohibited by a statute rather than by a regulation.’”55 
Discarding the TSA regulations that prohibited disclosure of SSI, the 
Federal Circuit focused exclusively on the statutory language of 
ATSA,56 ultimately determining the Act was not specific enough to 
prohibit MacLean’s disclosure of SSI.57 The Federal Circuit reversed 
and remanded for consideration of whether MacLean reasonably 
believed the 2003 directive presented a “substantial and specific 
danger” to public safety, in which case the WPA would apply, 
protecting MacLean’s conduct and blocking DHS from taking 
personnel action against him.58 
II.   LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  History of SSI Disclosure Prohibitions 
Beginning in 1974, Congress required the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) to “prescribe regulations prohibiting the 
disclosure of information obtained or developed in carrying out 
security or research and development activities” if “disclosing the 
information would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” 
“reveal a trade secret or privileged or confidential commercial or 
financial information,” or “be detrimental to the safety of passengers 
in air transportation.”59 Pursuant to that mandate, the FAA 
promulgated detailed regulations classifying certain information as 
SSI and restricting disclosure of SSI.60 
 
 
 54.  Id. at 1310. 
 55.  Id. at 1308. 
 56.  Id.; see also 49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r)(C) (West 2014) (“Notwithstanding section 552 of title 
5, the Under Secretary shall prescribe regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information 
obtained or developed in carrying out security . . . if the Under Secretary decides that disclosing 
the information would . . . be detrimental to the security of transportation.”). 
 57.  MacLean IV, 714 F.3d at 1310. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745, 1117; Air Transportation 
Security Act of 1974 § 316, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 409, 417. 
 60.  14 C.F.R. § 191.5 (2000); 14 C.F.R. § 191 (1977). 
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The Air Transportation Security Act (ATSA) reassigned that duty 
to the TSA, and transferred the SSI regulations to TSA’s authority.61 
Subsequently, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 moved the TSA 
into the newly created DHS.62 A separate provision of the Homeland 
Security Act expanded on TSA’s statutory mandate to prohibit 
disclosure of SSI.63 
B. The Chrysler Default Rule and the Legislative History of the WPA 
This case hinges on whether the TSA regulations promulgating 
ATSA, 49 U.S.C. § 114(r), can be considered “law” for purposes of the 
WPA.64 If they are not, MacLean will be protected from adverse 
personnel action because of his unauthorized disclosure.65 To 
determine whether Congress intended TSA regulations to function as 
laws, it is helpful to examine the legislative history.66 Looking to the 
origins of the Act, Congress changed the language in the original draft 
from ‘specifically prohibited by law, rule, or regulation’ to just 
‘specifically prohibited by law’ in the final version. At first blush, the 
removal of “rule, or regulation” appears clearly targeted at excluding 
these terms from consideration.67 
 
 
 61.  Aviation and Transportation Security Act § 101(e), Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597, 
603 (2001) (codified at scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.A.); see also Civil Aviation Security Rules, 
67 Fed. Reg. 8340, 8352 (Feb. 22, 2002). 
 62.  Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 403(2), Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2178. 
 63.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 1601(b), 49 U.S.C.A. § 114 (West 2014), reads as 
follows: 
Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5 [the FOIA], the Under Secretary shall prescribe 
regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information obtained or developed in 
carrying out security under authority of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
(Public Law 107-71) or under chapter 449 of this title if the Under Secretary decides 
that disclosing the information would— 
(A) be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;  
(B) reveal a trade secret or privileged or confidential commercial or financial 
information; or  
(C) be detrimental to the security of transportation. 
 64.  Steve Vladek, Argument Preview: How Much Control do Agencies Have over What 
Whistleblowers May Disclose, SCOTUSBLOG, (Oct. 31, 2014 12:00 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/argument-preview-how-much-control-do-agencies-have-
over-what-whistleblowers-may-disclose/. 
 65.  See 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8) (West 2014) (prohibiting personnel action for disclosing 
information that is reasonably believed to, amongst other things, violate law). 
 66.  See FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 263 (1975) (stating that where the law is “unclear 
and ambiguous” analysis “compel[s] resort to the legislative history”); cf. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (comparing use of legislative history in statutory 
interpretation to “looking over a crowd and picking out your friends”). 
 67.  See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). 
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In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, however, the Court created a default 
rule for interpretation of the phrase “by law.”68 Chrysler interpreted 
the phrase “authorized by law” to include not just authorization 
conferred directly by statute, but also by “properly promulgated, 
substantive agency regulations.”69 Absent a clear showing of contrary 
Congressional intent—that is some indication that “by law” includes 
only statutes—the phrase “by law” must be read to include both 
statutes and regulations. Given the decision in Chrysler predates the 
WPA by a decade, had Congress meant to limit the “specifically 
prohibited by law” proviso to operate only with statutes and not with 
regulations, it would have to make “a clear showing of contrary 
legislative intent.”70 
III.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Petitioner’s Arguments 
DHS chiefly contendes “the Federal Circuit’s decision seriously 
undermines the effectiveness of the congressionally mandated SSI 
regime, invites individual federal employees to make disclosures that 
will threaten public safety, and warrants [the Supreme] Court’s 
immediate review.”71 
DHS first challenges the Federal Circuit’s finding that TSA 
regulations are not “law” for purposes of the WPA proviso, 
contending that law within the congressionally created SSI 
nondisclosure scheme specifically prohibits disclosure of SSI.72 Citing 
the Chrysler default rule for the proposition that “by law” includes 
not only statutes, but also “properly promulgated, substantive agency 
regulations,” DHS insists Congress meant to include agency 
regulations within the scope of the WPA proviso.73 If Congress did not 
 
 68.  Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979). 
 69.  Id. at 295 (propounding a presumption in favor of reading “specifically prohibited by 
law” to include both statutes and regulations, absent a contrary indication of Congressional 
intent). 
 70.  See id. at 295–96 (“It has been established in a variety of contexts that properly 
promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the ‘force and effect of law.’ This doctrine is 
so well established that agency regulations implementing federal statutes have been held to pre-
empt state law under the Supremacy Clause. It would therefore take a clear showing of contrary 
legislative intent before the phrase ‘authorized by law’ in § 1905 could be held to have a 
narrower ambit than the traditional understanding.”). 
 71.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 11. 
 72.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 18. 
 73.  Id. at 19–20. 
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desire such a reading of the WPA proviso, DHS argues they should 
have made this explicit, and in the absence of contrary legislative 
intent the default rule in Chrysler applies.74 
DHS acknowledges the legislative history of the WPA, including 
the Senate and House Conference reports that describe the 
Congressional intent in changing the language of the proviso.75 DHS 
focuses on the fact that Congress ultimately chose the House version, 
“by law,” over the more specific Senate version, “by statute,” arguing 
this was a deliberate choice evincing Congress’s intent that the 
proviso be read generally, in keeping with Chrysler, to include 
statutes, rules, and regulations.76 
Furthermore, DHS points out the nondisclosure regulations have 
the force and effect of law because they were affirmatively required 
by Congressional statute.77 Congress explicitly delegated legislative 
authority to TSA to create regulations prohibiting SSI disclosure on 
the basis of three distinct criteria: if the information was (1) “an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”; (2) “reveal[ed] a trade 
secret or privileged or confidential commercial or financial 
information”; or (3) was “detrimental to the safety of passengers in air 
transportation.”78 In addition, DHS relies on the fact that Congress 
was already aware of the content of TSA’s nondisclosure regulations 
when it enacted § 114(r)(1).79 Because Congress passed a law 
affirming and expanding TSA’s regulatory authority after TSA’s 
regulatory scheme was already in place, DHS contends that Congress 
not only acknowledged the legitimacy of TSA’s existing regulations 
but also affirmatively endowed them with the force of law.80 
Alternatively, DHS argues that even without counting the TSA 
regulations within the scope of “law,” § 114(r)(1) itself specifically 
prohibits MacLean’s disclosure.81 For support, they cite Administrator, 
FAA v. Robertson,82 where the Court interpreted the phrase 
 
 74.  Id. at 13. 
 75.  Id. at 26–27. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 21–22. 
 78.  Air Transportation Security Act of 1974 § 316, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 417. 
 79.  See Homeland Security Act § 1601, 116 Stat. 2312; 67 Fed. Reg. 8340, 8352 
(demonstrating Congress’s awareness of the TSA’s nondisclosure regulations). 
 80.  See Ablemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 404, 414 n.8 (1975) (“Congress is 
presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt 
that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.”). 
 81.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 28. 
 82.  422 U.S. 255 (1975).  
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“specifically exempted from disclosure by statute”83 to include a 
statute authorizing the FAA to exercise broad interest-balancing 
discretion in determining whether certain information should be 
disclosed.84 DHS argues the phrase “specifically exempted from 
disclosure by statute” is even narrower than “specifically prohibited 
by law,” but still, the Robertson Court found that the phrase 
encompassed an SSI disclosure regulatory scheme that gave broad 
discretion to the agency.85 In Robertson, the statute allowed the 
agency to classify certain information using a general and untethered 
interest-balancing approach;86 here, the statute predicated the 
agency’s creation of regulations on three enumerated criteria.87 DHS 
argues that if the Court upheld a regulatory scheme in Robertson 
broader than the one at issue here, a fortiori the Court must uphold 
the regulatory scheme here.88 
Finally, from a policy perspective, DHS warns that allowing 
federal employees to publicly disclose SSI would subvert Congress’s 
intent and create serious risks to public safety.89 The WPA, DHS 
claims, does not allow employees to go to the media whenever they 
have a reasonable belief that particular information shows 
government wrongdoing.90 Rather, the statutory protection only 
applies when the employee raises his or her concerns through 
appropriate channels, such as to the Office of the Inspector General 
or Office of Special Counsel, thereby allowing the appropriate 
officials to inspect an employee’s claims while keeping the SSI 
secure.91 DHS argues that if an employee could run to the media any 
time he or she had a plausible objection to a directive involving SSI, 
the resulting public disclosure would sink Congress’s system for 
 
 83.  See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(3) (West 2014). 
 84.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 28–31 (citing Robertson, 422 U.S. at 256–58). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  The statute at issue in Robertson allowed the agency to withhold information 
whenever the agency adjudged disclosure was “not required in the interest of the public” and 
“would adversely affect the interests” of someone objecting to the disclosure. 422 U.S. at 258 n.4 
(quoting 49 U.S.C.A. § 1504 (West 2014)). See also id. at 261–67. 
 87.  See 49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r)(1)(A)–(C) (West 2014); see supra note 78 and accompanying 
text. 
 88.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 30 (“The combination of a broader proviso and a 
more specific nondisclosure statute makes this an even easier case for proviso coverage than 
Robertson itself.”). 
 89.  Id. at 38–39. 
 90.  Id. at 36 (citing 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8)(B) (West 2014)). 
 91.  Id. 
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keeping classified information out of the wrong hands.92 In effect, this 
reading of the WPA would allow each of the TSA’s more than 60,000 
employees to disclose any information to the media that they 
personally determined necessary for the public to know, regardless of 
the broader implications.93 Such a result, DHS argues, would not only 
contravene Congress’s purpose in creating the regulatory scheme, but 
would impermissibly compromise national security.94 
B.  Respondent’s Arguments 
Respondent MacLean counters that even if TSA regulations 
specifically prohibited his disclosure of SSI, they are not “law” and 
therefore do not apply under the WPA proviso.95 He insists the agency 
cannot rely on its own regulations to remove him for disclosing SSI 
because the key sentence of the WPA authorizes whistleblowers to 
disclose “any violation of any law, rule, or regulation,” but allows 
punishment of such disclosures only if they are “specifically 
prohibited by law.”96 The Court has previously held “[a] statute that in 
one section refers to ‘law, rule or regulation,’ and in another section to 
only ‘laws’ cannot, unless we abandon all pretense at precise 
communication, be deemed to mean the same thing in both places.”97 
As a result, MacLean claims the plain language of the WPA proviso 
clearly excludes regulations.98 
DHS warns MacLean’s argument threatens the integrity of the 
SSI nondisclosure statutory scheme, and MacLean counters that 
DHS’s argument threatens the integrity of the WPA.99 MacLean 
argues that allowing agencies to use their own regulations to block 
disclosure of dangerous or illegal agency practices counteracts the 
purpose of the WPA.100 Congress changed the language in an earlier 
draft of the statute—“specifically prohibited by law, rule, or 
regulation”—to the present version, “specifically prohibited by 
law”—because it feared exactly this “adoption of internal procedural 
regulations against disclosure, [] thereby enabl[ing] an agency to 
 
 92.  Id. at 37. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 38–40. 
 95.  Brief for Respondent at 19, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, No. 13-894 (U.S. 
Mar. 28, 2014). 
 96.  See id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
 97.  Dep’t of Treasury, I.R.S. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922, 932 (1990). 
 98.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 16. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 22. 
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discourage an employee from coming forward with allegations of 
wrongdoing.”101 
In addition, MacLean asserts ATSA makes it clear that “nothing 
in [§ 114(r)], or any other provision of law, shall be construed to 
authorize the designation of information as sensitive security 
information” in order to “conceal a violation of law, inefficiency, or 
administrative error” or “prevent embarrassment to a person, 
organization, or agency.”102 The concern at the forefront of Congress’s 
mind was that by allowing the agency to decide for itself what 
information was SSI, the agency might classify information to cover 
up wrongdoing.103 MacLean contends this is exactly what happened in 
his case, and exactly the reason the WPA exists—to allow employees 
to come forward with legitimate claims of misfeasance without fear of 
reprisal, even when those claims involve disclosure of SSI.104 
Thus, from a policy standpoint, MacLean warns that including 
regulations to be within the ambit of “specifically prohibited by law” 
runs the risk of stifling whistleblowers and perpetuating undesirable 
internal conduct, including “violation[s] of law, inefficienc[ies], or 
administrative error[s.]”105 MacLean argues this result could not have 
been the intent of Congress in passing the statute.106 
MacLean next turns to DHS’s argument that even without TSA’s 
regulatory prohibitions, the statute itself specifically prohibits his 
disclosure. MacLean counters that § 114(r) does not prohibit anything 
at all—it merely “allows DHS ‘to prescribe regulations prohibiting the 
disclosure of information.’”107 
Even if it were a prohibition, MacLean argues, ATSA’s broad 
authorization for the TSA to shield information is not specific enough 
to meet the demands of the WPA proviso.108 He compares § 114(r) to 
a provision of the Trade Secrets Act, which in great detail prohibits 
 
 101.  S. REP. NO. 95-969, at 19 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.S.C.A.N. 2723, 2743. 
 102.  49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r)(4)(A)–(D) (West 2014); see American Communities’ Right to 
Public Information Act § 561(c)(1), Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2182 (2009); see also 49 
U.S.C.A. § 40119(b) (West 2014) (illustrating similar limitations on the Department of 
Transportation’s authority). 
 103.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 22. 
 104.  Id. (“The ‘purpose of the WPA’ is to allow employees to make [] disclosures ‘without 
fearing retaliatory action by their supervisors or those who might be harmed by the 
disclosures.’”) (citing Willis v. Dep’t of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 105.  49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r)(4)(A). 
 106.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 7–8. 
 107.  Id. at 17. 
 108.  Id. 
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disclosure of “information concern[ing] or related to the trade secrets, 
processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, 
confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, 
losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, 
or association . . . .”109 By contrast, § 114(r) lists no such categories, but 
prohibits only generally the disclosure of information that may “be 
detrimental to the security of transportation.”110 
MacLean asserts the WPA strikes a balance between the benefit 
of allowing whistleblowers to reveal agency wrongdoing on the one 
hand, and the need to keep certain information secret for national 
security purposes on the other.111 But MacLean contends DHS may 
not decide where this balance lies; only Congress can, because in the 
plain language of the WPA, Congress chose not to delegate that 
power to the agency.112 As a result, he argues, DHS may not prohibit 
his disclosure and consequently has no grounds to take personnel 
action against him for blowing the whistle. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Assuming MacLean “reasonably believe[d]” he was revealing an 
FAMS deployment plan which would cause a “substantial and specific 
danger to public safety,” he will be protected under the WPA unless 
his disclosure was “specifically prohibited by law.”113 His disclosure 
was indeed “specifically prohibited,” but not by statute—only by the 
agency regulation promulgating the statute.114 If the Court determines 
these regulations are “law” then MacLean’s removal will be sustained. 
If, however, the Court determines only “statutory law and court 
interpretations of those statutes”115 may be considered law for 
purposes of the WPA, MacLean’s disclosure will be protected. In light 
of the clear showing of Congressional intent evident from the 
statutory history, the latter ruling appears the more probable. 
 
 109.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1905 (West 2014). 
 110.  49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r)(1)(C) (West 2014). 
 111.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 47. 
 112.  Id. at 18. 
 113. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (West 2014); see also MacLean IV, 714 F.3d 1301, 1311 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (Wallach, J., concurring) (“[T]he facts alleged, if proven, allege conduct at the 
core of the Whistleblower Protection Act.”). 
 114.  See MacLean IV, 714 F.3d at 1309 (“[T]he ultimate source of prohibition of Mr. 
MacLean’s disclosure is not a statute but a regulation, which the parties agree cannot be ‘law 
under the WPA.’”). 
 115.  56 M.S.P.R. 536, 542–43 (M.S.P.B. 1993) (citing H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1717, at 4 
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2864). 
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It bears noting that at the time of his disclosure, MacLean was a 
first-time offender with a spotless record, and appears to have acted 
out of genuine concern for the public safety.116 He stood to gain 
nothing from his disclosure, and in this sense his circumstances are 
quite different from other FAMs who have been disciplined by TSA 
for disclosing SSI.117 His case falls squarely under the scenario 
envisioned by the WPA.118 
Nevertheless, DHS’s policy arguments are compelling. National 
security interests, which involve the safety of society at large, will 
generally outweigh the interest of the individual no matter how well-
intentioned.119 MacLean acted unilaterally and contrary to explicit 
agency regulations in approaching the media, and according to TSA 
Officer in Charge Frank Donzanti, he did so without “all the 
information. He’s not in a position to make that kind of decision. 
There [were] other factors that [went] into [the 2003 directive] he 
[was] unaware of.”120 His decision thus created an immediate 
vulnerability in the security network managed by the TSA, forcing the 
agency to reallocate scarce resources to cover a security gap.121 From 
an interest-balancing standpoint, the benefit of MacLean’s disclosure 
is almost certainly outweighed by the agency’s interest in maintaining 
effective national security policies.122 
Powerful as the policy arguments are, however, the question is 
ultimately one of statutory interpretation. Congress’s intent in passing 
the WPA will control the outcome of the case. In the process of going 
from “by law, rule, or regulation” to simply “by law,” each chamber of 
Congress approved a different version of the statute: the House 
passed a version that read, “specifically prohibited by law,”123 while the 
Senate passed a version that read, “specifically prohibited by 
statute.”124 The House version, “by law,” was ultimately chosen and 
 
 116.  MacLean IV, 714 F.3d at 1306. 
 117.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 106a–08a. 
 118.  MacLean IV, 714 F.3d at 1311 (Wallach, J., concurring) (“[T]he facts alleged, if proven, 
allege conduct at the core of the Whistleblower Protection Act.”). 
 119.  See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“Pressing public 
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions.”) 
 120.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 104a. 
 121.  See MacLean IV, 714 F.3d at 1306 (“[B]ecause even a possibility that a Marshal may be 
onboard is an important deterrent to terrorist activity, Mr. MacLean’s disclosure compromised 
flight safety and forced the Agency to reallocate resources to address this new vulnerability.”). 
 122.  See, e.g., National Security: Overview, RIGHT2INFO.ORG, 
http://www.right2info.org/exceptions-to-access/national-security (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
 123.  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1717, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2864. 
 124.  S. REP. NO. 95-969, at 19 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.S.C.A.N. 2723, 2743. 
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remains on the books today.125 
This legislative history suggests two mutually exclusive 
possibilities. First, by choosing the House version over the Senate 
version and substituting the more general term “law” for the more 
precise term “statute,” Congress meant to include rules and 
regulations as “laws” within the meaning of the WPA proviso. Or, 
second, by reducing the original language from “by law, rule, or 
regulation” to simply “by law,” Congress intended to limit the proviso 
to include only statutory law. 
If Congress meant to include rules and regulations in the WPA 
proviso, it could have left the statutory language of the original draft 
intact.126 The phrase “law, rule, or regulation” appears more than 
twenty times elsewhere in the WPA, seven times in § 2302(b) alone,127 
and even in the same sentence as the proviso in question.128 It would 
not make sense for Congress to use the phrase “by law, rule or 
regulation” throughout if it understood “by law” to have the same 
meaning. After all, “[a] statute that in one section refers to ‘law, rule 
or regulation,’ and in another section to only ‘laws’ cannot, unless we 
abandon all pretense at precise communication, be deemed to mean 
the same thing in both places.”129 
Chrysler created a presumption that the phrase “by law” includes 
rules and regulations, but “a clear showing of contrary legislative 
intent” may rebut this presumption.130 Here, the Senate and House 
Conference reports provide the “clear showing” needed. The Senate 
report reveals Congress’s concern that the original “by law, rule, or 
regulation” language “would encourage the adoption of internal 
procedural regulations against disclosure, and thereby enable an 
agency to discourage an employee from coming forward with 
allegations of wrongdoing.”131 The Senate chose the statutory language 
it did to eliminate the exact kind of conduct at play in MacLean—the 
removal of an employee for whistle-blowing despite adverse agency 
 
 125.  49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r) (West 2014). 
 126.  See S. REP. NO. 95-969, at 21 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 95-1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1978).  
 127.  See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 2302(b)(1)(E), (6), (8)(A)(i), (8)(B)(i), (9)(A), (12), (13) (West 
2014). 
 128.  The WPA protects a disclosure “of any violation of any law, rule or regulation . . . if 
such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law.” 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (West 2014). 
 129.  Dep’t of Treasury, I.R.S. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922, 932 (1990). 
 130.  Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 296 (1979). 
 131.  S. REP. NO. 95-969, at 19 (1978). 
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regulations designed to keep him quiet.132 The Senate Report thereby 
satisfies the exception to the default rule of Chrysler. 
However, Congress ultimately chose to enact the House version 
and not the Senate version of the bill, limiting the value of the Senate 
report. Thankfully, the House Conference report provides an equally 
“clear showing of contrary legislative intent,” stating flatly that 
“prohibited by law” refers to “statutory law and court interpretations 
of those statutes . . . not . . . to agency rules and regulations.”133 From 
this, it seems obvious that Congress did not intend “by law” to include 
regulations for purposes of the WPA, but only statutory law.134 
Thus, the regulations prohibiting disclosure of SSI are irrelevant 
for purposes of determining whether the WPA protects MacLean’s 
conduct, and only the statutory language of ATSA itself may 
specifically prohibit the disclosure in such a way that the WPA will 
not apply.135 
In Kent v. General Services Administration,136 the Merit Systems 
Protection Board addressed the WPA proviso at issue here in the 
context of the Trade Secrets Act.137 The Board held that the Act 
specifically prohibited disclosure by law and not by regulation, 
because the Act used extremely detailed and comprehensive 
descriptions of the prohibitions and penalties for public disclosure of 
information.138 For example, the Act prohibits disclosure of 
“information concern[ing] or related to the trade secrets, processes, 
operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential 
statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or 
expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or 
association . . . .”139 
ATSA, by contrast, broadly prohibits disclosure of information 
“detrimental to security of transportation.”140 It lists no specific 
categories, only general criteria, and it “gives some discretion to the 
Agency to fashion regulations for prohibiting disclosure.”141 ATSA 
 
 132.  See id.  
 133.  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1717, at 4 (1978). 
 134.  See id.  
 135.  MacLean IV, 714 F.3d 1301, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 136.  56 M.S.P.R. 536 (M.S.P.B. 1993). 
 137.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1905 (West 2014). 
 138.  56 M.S.P.R. at 543–46. 
 139.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1905 (West 2014). 
 140.  49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r) (West 2014). 
 141.  MacLean IV, 714 F.3d 1301, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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therefore seems too general to “specifically prohibit” the conduct in 
question on its own, particularly compared against the specificity of 
the Trade Secrets Act. 
Still, ATSA specifically charges the Secretary of Transportation 
with prescribing regulations pursuant to certain criteria.142 The 
distinction is a fine one. ATSA does not fall squarely under the WPA 
proviso, but also does not delegate authority to the agency without 
circumscribing agency discretion in any way.143 The statute falls in a 
gray area. It does not specifically prohibit disclosure by law, but it 
does prescribe criteria that the agency is obligated to use in creating 
regulations specifically prohibiting disclosure.144 
Difficult as it is to nail down ATSA’s specificity for purposes of 
the WPA, analysis of the motivation behind ATSA’s enactment may 
prove helpful. ATSA was not primarily intended to prevent employee 
disclosure of sensitive information; rather, it was meant to empower 
DHS to reject the public’s requests for confidential intelligence, 
notwithstanding the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).145 In the 
hands of the general public, sensitive security information could be 
used towards any variety of undesirable ends contrary to national 
security objectives.146 ATSA was designed as a privacy shield to limit 
the potential impact of the FOIA on national security by forbidding 
private citizens from asking for certain information—not by 
forbidding public employees from disclosing it in the right 
circumstances.147 
Section 114(r) does not specifically prohibit the disclosure of 
SSI.148 Compared side-by-side with a statute like the Trade Secrets 
Act, which does prohibit disclosure of SSI, § 114(r) falls short of the 
mark set by the WPA and Kent.149  “[W]hen Congress seeks to prohibit 
 
 142.  49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r) (West 2014). 
 143.  Maclean IV, 714 F.3d at 1309. 
 144.  See Air Transportation Security Act of 1974, supra note 76. 
 145.  See Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (rejecting the 
argument that by expressly including the phrase “[n]otwithstanding section 552 of Title 5 
relating to freedom of information,” Congress intended the statute “not to shield information 
from disclosure under any statute other than FOIA”). 
 146.  See generally Dallas Boyd, Protecting Sensitive Information: The Virtue of Self-
Restraint, 7 HOMELAND SEC. AFF. J., MAY 2011, available at http://www.hsaj.org/ 
?download&mode=dl&h&w&drm=resources%2Fvolume7%2Fissue1%2Fpdfs%2F&f=7.1.10.p
df&altf=7.1.10.pdf. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  See 56 M.S.P.R. 536, 543–46 (M.S.P.D. 1993). 
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disclosure of specific types of information, it has the ability to draft 
the statute accordingly.”150 Congress did not do so here. Instead, 
Congress made an intentional choice in drafting ATSA the way it did: 
rather than codify prohibitions on disclosure of SSI in a statute, it 
gave the TSA broad discretion to create regulations that prohibit 
disclosure of SSI.151 The distinction is a crucial one, precisely because 
of provisos like the one at issue in the WPA. 
In conjunction with the language of the WPA proviso, § 114(r) 
may be read as a deliberate choice by Congress to leave the door 
open for whistleblowers to disclose SSI exactly as MacLean did. In 
fact, when Congress discovered the deployment plan then being used 
by TSA, multiple members objected to the plan and created a 
national controversy that resulted in the withdrawal of the 2003 
directive.152 Under this reading, the statutory scheme functioned 
exactly as designed, stopping the agency from using self-serving 
regulations to hide information from Congress and prevent exposure 
of an embarrassing internal agency mistake.153 
Because ATSA does not meet the “specifically prohibited by law” 
standard demanded by the WPA, no “law” specifically prohibited 
MacLean’s disclosure.154 Consequently, the Court will likely uphold 
the decision of the Federal Circuit in favor of MacLean. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s decision will hinge on the statutory language of the 
WPA proviso itself and the legislative intent behind the textual 
changes to the WPA revealed in the Senate and House Conference 
reports. Both of these point to the conclusion that Congress meant to 
exclude rules and regulations from the “specifically prohibited by 
law” proviso. Thus, despite the strong national security interest in 
placing the confidentiality of SSI above the determination by an 
employee that he or she should disclose potentially dangerous 
information, the Court will likely affirm the Federal Circuit’s finding 
that MacLean’s disclosure was not prohibited by law, and remand for 
a determination of whether he reasonably believed there was a 
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. As MacLean 
 
 150.  MacLean IV, 714 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 151.  49 U.S.C.A. § 114(r) (West 2014). 
 152.  MacLean IV, 714 F.3d at 1304. 
 153.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 19. 
 154.  MacLean IV, 714 F.3d at 1310. 
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was a first-time offender with a clean record, who acted out of public 
concern, and gained no individual benefit from his disclosure, it seems 
probable that on remand the court will find him protected by the 
WPA. 
